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1 Introduction
We present an assignment model of house price determination where houses are heterogeneous
by quality and households are heterogeneous by income. Our main purpose is to study the rela-
tion of the distributions of income and house prices. A central motivating question is the impact
of income inequality on the distribution of housing prices. It has been argued that the increase
in consumption inequality has been less than the increase in income inequality because as the
rich get richer they bid the prices of best locations ever higher. According to our theoretical
results the impact of increased income inequality on top house prices is ambiguous. In our
empirical application we estimate that the aggregate impact of recently increased inequality on
house prices in the US has been negative, and positive only within the top decile.
From a distributional perspective, a central feature of the housing market is that housing is
not a fungible commodity but comes embedded in indivisible and heterogeneous units. What
we refer to as “houses,” for brevity, are really bundles of land and structures (including homes in
multi-unit dwellings). The quality of land is inherently heterogeneous because locations differ
in their attractiveness due to factors such as distance from the center and view of the sea. The
supply of structures is more or less fixed in the short term, although adjustable in the long run.
(Qualify of structures can also have a fixed component, due to zoning restrictions or the scarcity
value of vintage architecture.) Another key feature of housing is that it takes up a large part of
household expenditure, so income effects may be quite significant. Our modeling approach is
based on an assignment model with non-transferable utility, which allows for income effects.
We consider a single metropolitan region, where the set of households is fixed. The distri-
butions of income and house quality are exogenous, while the distribution of house prices is
endogenous, with the exception of the cheapest or “marginal” house. The market does not con-
sist of initially distinct classes of buyers and sellers but, rather, of a population of households
who each own one house and each wish to live in one house. In general, the joint distribution of
houses and income is arbitrary, which results potentially in a lot of trading between households.
Equilibrium prices depend on the joint distribution of endowments, not just on the marginal
distributions of income and house quality.
With an arbitrary initial endowment the equilibrium conditions in our setup would be quite
1
complicated. However, we focus on the equilibrium prices that emerge after all trading op-
portunities have been exploited. In empirical terms, we assume that all households prefer to
live in their current house. Under this “post-trade” assumption we can ask what distribution of
unobserved house quality, together with the observed distribution of incomes, would give rise
to the observed price distribution as the equilibrium outcome of our model. We also find that
a suitably parametrized CES utility function allows us to match the change in the price distrib-
ution under the assumption that it was caused by the change in incomes while house qualities
remained unchanged. We then use the inferred distribution of house qualities and our preferred
utility parametrization to generate counterfactuals that measure the impact of the changes in
income inequality on house prices.
In most assignment models a productive complementarity makes it efficient to match “the
best with the best,” i.e., total output is maximized by Positive Assortative Matching (PAM). Our
setup is a pure exchange economy, but there is another driving force towards PAM, namely the
diminishing marginal rate of substitution. The wealthy must live in the most desirable locations
and have the highest levels of non-housing consumption, or else there would be unrealized gains
from trade. Indeed, in our model, the only reason why the wealthy inhabit the best houses is
that they can best afford them. In order to focus on the impact of changes in income distribution
we assume homogeneous preferences, so the ordering of houses by market price is also the
ordering by quality.
In our empirical application we use data from all six metropolitan regions that were covered
by the American Housing Survey (AHS) both in 1998 and 2007. We consider counterfactual
income distributions for 2007 where all incomes grow uniformly since 1998 at the same rate as
the actual mean income in the city. (I.e. the shape of the counterfactual distribution is the same
as the actual shape in 1998). This counterfactual generates house prices that are on average
0   10% higher, depending on the city. (Due to top coding, all results omit the top 3% of the
price distribution). This implies that the increase in inequality has resulted in lower prices on
average than would have prevailed under uniform income growth. The contribution of uneven
income growth on house prices has been positive only within the top decile, with magnitudes
of up to 12%.
The reason why the counterfactual of uniform income growth would have lead to higher
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prices at the bottom of the quality distribution is intuitive: if low-income households had higher
incomes they would use some of it to bid for low-quality houses. However, in a matching
market with positive sorting, any changes in prices spill upwards in the quality distribution.
This is because the binding outside opportunity of any (inframarginal) household is that they
must want to buy their equilibrium match rather than the next best house. The equilibrium price
gradient—the price difference between two "neighboring" houses in the quality distribution—
is pinned down by how much the households at the relevant part of the income distribution are
willing to pay for the quality difference. The price level of any particular house is then given by
the summation of all price gradients below, plus the price of the marginal house. Conversely,
after an increase in income inequality, downward pressure on prices from the bottom of the
distribution counteracts the local increase in willingness-to-pay among better-off households
whose incomes are now higher. In principle, it is possible for all house prices to go down in
response to an increase in inequality (but we don’t find this to be the case in any of the six cities
in our data).
In the next section we discuss related literature. In Section 3 we present the model and
our theoretical results. In Section 4 we show how the model can be used for inference and
counterfactuals. Our empirical application is presented in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our model is an assignment model with non-transferable utility. Assignment models are models
of matching markets that focus on the combined impact of indivisibilities and two-sided het-
erogeneity; for a review see Sattinger (1993). All other frictions, such as imperfect information
or transaction costs, are assumed away. Both sides of the market are assumed to have a contin-
uum of types, so there is no market power or "bargaining" as all agents have arbitrarily close
competitors. Assignment models typically include an assumption of a complementarity in pro-
duction, which results in assortative matching and equilibrium prices that depend on the shapes
of the type distributions on both sides of the market but in a reasonably tractable way. Assign-
ment models have usually been applied to labor markets, where the productive complementarity
is between job types and worker types, as in Sattinger (1979) and Teulings (1995), or between
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workers themselves in a team production setting, as in Kremer (1993). In our setup there is no
complementarity in the usual sense, but equilibrium nevertheless involves assortative matching
by wealth and house quality, essentially because housing is a normal good. We don’t restrict
the shapes of the distributions, and our nonparametric method for inferring the unobserved type
distribution and for constructing counterfactuals is similar to Terviö (2008).
The closest existing literature to our paper is concerned with the dispersion of house prices
between cities, while abstracting away from heterogeneity within cities. Van Nieuwerburgh and
Weill (2010) study house price dispersion across US cities using a dynamic model, where there
is matching by individual ability and regional productivity. Within each city housing is produced
with a linear technology, but there is a city-specific resource constraint for the construction of
new houses. This causes housing to become relatively more expensive in regions that experience
increases in relative productivity. Houses are non-tradable across cities while labor is mobile,
so intuitively this result is similar to the Balassa-Samuelson effect in trade theory. In their
calibration Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill find that, by assuming a particular increase in the
dispersion of ability, they can reasonably well generate the observed increase in wage dispersion
and the (larger) increase in the house price dispersion across cities. Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai
(2006) have a related model with two locations and heterogeneous preferences for living in one
of two possible cities. One of the cities is assumed to be a more attractive “superstar” city in
the sense that it has a binding supply constraint for land. An increase in top incomes results in
more competition for scarce land, thus leading the price of houses in the superstar city to go
up. In Ortalo-Magne and Prat (2010) household location choice between regions is modeled as
part of a larger portfolio problem, where each region has a fixed amount of (infinitely divisible)
housing capital. Different regions offer different income processes, so location decisions as
well as house prices are affected by hedging considerations.
Moretti (2010) has argued that the recent increase in income inequality in the US overstates
the actual increase in consumption inequality, due to changes in house prices between cities. He
considers a two-city model with two types of labor, where changes in relative housing prices
between cities can be affected by productivity (demand for labor) and amenities (location pref-
erence). Worker utility is linear but there is heterogeneity by location preference, in equilibrium
the marginal worker within each skill group has to be indifferent between cities. Moretti finds
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that a fifth of the observed increase in college wage premium between 1980 and 2000 was ab-
sorbed by higher cost of housing, and that the most plausible cause for this is an increase in
demand for high-skill workers in regions that attracted more high-skill workers.
Most dynamic macroeconomic models with housing assume that housing is a homogenous
malleable good. In any given period, there is then just one unit price for housing. An exception
is the property ladder structure that is used by Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006) and Rios-Rull and
Sanchez-Marcos (2008), where there are two types of houses: relatively small “flats” and bigger
“houses”. For our purposes, such a distribution would be far too coarse. In general, the macro
literature focuses on the time series aspects of a general level of housing prices, and abstracts
away from the cross-sectional complications of the market. We focus on the cross-sectional and
distributional aspects of the housing market, and abstract away from the time-series aspect.
One step in our empirical application is that we estimate the elasticity parameter of a con-
stant elasticity of substitution utility function for housing and other consumption. This links our
paper to a literature that uses structural models to estimate that parameter; two recent papers are
by Li, Liu and Yau (2009) and Bajari, Chan, Krueger and Miller (2010). These studies estimate
the elasticity parameter within a life cycle model using household level data from the US. How-
ever, as far as we know, we are the first to exploit changes in the cross-sectional distribution
of housing prices to estimate household preference parameters. This is possible in our model
because housing prices are in general a non-linear function of housing quality.
There is a long tradition in explaining heterogeneous land prices in urban economics, going
back to the classic Von Thünen model, and Alonso (1964). In urban economics models the
exogenous heterogeneity of land is due to distance from the urban center. The focus is on
explaining how land use is determined in equilibrium, including phenomena such as parcel size
and population density. In modern urban economics1 there are also some models with income
effects. Heterogeneity of land is modeled as a transport cost, which is a function of distance
from the center, and price differences between locations are practically pinned down by the
transport cost function.
Models with heterogeneous land have been used in urban economics in connection with
endogenous public good provision, in the tradition of Tiebout (1956). Epple and Sieg (1999)
1See, for example, the textbook by Fujita (1989).
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estimate preference parameters in a structural model where the equilibrium looks like assorta-
tive matching by income and public good quality, although the latter is a choice variable at the
level of the community. Glazer, Kanniainen, and Poutvaara (2008) analyze the effects of income
redistribution in a setup where heterogeneous land is owned by absentee landlords. They show
that the presence of (uniformly distributed) heterogeneity mitigates the impact of tax competi-
tion between jurisdictions because taxation that drives some of the rich to emigrate also leads
them to vacate high-quality land, allowing the poor to consume better land than before.
Matching models have long been applied to the housing market from a more theoretical
perspective, although it is perhaps more accurate to say that housing has often been used in
theoretical matching literature as the motivating example of an indivisible good that needs to
be “matched” one-to-one with the buyers. The classic reference is Shapley and Scarf (1974),
who present a model where houses are bartered by households who are each endowed with
and each wish to consume exactly one house. They show that, regardless of the preference
orderings by the households, there always exists at least one equilibrium allocation. Miyagawa
(2001) extends the model by adding a second, continuous good, i.e., “money.” He shows that
the core assignment of houses can be implemented with a set of fixed prices for the houses. In
Miyagawa’s model utility is quasilinear, so there is no potential for income effects. The results
obtained in this literature are not directly applicable in our setup, as we have both indivisible
and continuous goods and utility is concave in the continuous good.
There exists also a large literature on two-sided assignment, where two ex ante distinct
classes of agents, "buyers" and "sellers," are matched, but these are further from our setup as
we have no such distinction.2 In our one-sided setup the reservation price of a seller depends
on the opportunities available to her as a buyer.
3 Model
We begin by introducing our setup in the context of an arbitrary initial endowment, which here
consists of a house of a particular level of quality and a level of income for every household.
We then restrict the possible endowments to "post-trade" allocations, that is, we assume that all
2See, for example, Legros and Newman (2007) and Caplin and Leahy (2010).
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mutually beneficial trades have already been made, so the role of equilibrium prices is merely
to enforce the no-trade equilibrium. The post-trade case is not only tractable but also empiri-
cally useful. Our interpretation of cross-sectional data is that, at current prices, each household
wishes to live in its current house.
Consider a one-period pure exchange economy, where a unit mass of households consume
two goods, housing and a composite good. Preferences are described by a utility function u,
same for all households. Houses come in indivisible units of exogenous quality, and utility
depends on the quality of the house, denoted by x. Preferences are standard: u is strictly in-
creasing, differentiable, and quasi-concave. Every household is endowed with and wishes to
consume exactly one house. A household’s income, denoted by , is interpreted as its endow-
ment of the composite good y. There are no informational imperfections, or other frictions
besides the indivisibility of houses.
A household endowment (x; ) can be described by a point in [0; 1]  R+, where in the
horizontal dimension i = Fx (x) represents the quantile in the distribution of house quality, and
the vertical dimension represents the amount of composite good. As preferences are homoge-
neous, the same indifference map applies to all households. Figure 1 depicts this economy. An
allocation is a joint distribution (of the unit mass of households) over the endowment space.
Assume that households are initially distributed smoothly over the endowment space so that
there are no atoms and no gaps in the support of either marginal distribution, and both means
are finite. The indivisibility of houses means that the resource constraint for x is rather stark:
the marginal distribution of x cannot be altered by trading. For the continuous good, only the
mean of consumption must match the mean of the endowments (Ey = E) which is assumed
strictly positive but finite.
Equilibrium consists of a price function p for houses and a matching of households to
houses; the composite good is used as the numeraire. Budget constraints are downward sloping
curves, because house prices must be increasing in quality (by the monotonicity of u). Figure 1
depicts the budget curve of a household endowed with income ~ and a house of quality ~x, it is
defined by ~ + p (~x) = y + p (x), where the right side is the cost of consumption. We refer to
the left side of the budget constraint as the household’s wealth. Wealth is endogenous because
it depends on the market value of the house that one is endowed with. However, households are
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atomistic, so from their point of view wealth and prices are exogenous.
[ Figure 1 here ]
The initial endowment is described by a distribution of households over the consumption
space, where house quality is on horizontal and composite good (“money”) on vertical axes.
Indifference curves are depicted in gray, while the red curve depicts the budget curve of a
household endowed with income ~ and a house of quality ~x. The shape of the budget curve
depends on the price function p.
All households with an endowment on the same budget curve trade to the point where the
budget curve is tangent to an indifference curve. In terms of Figure 1, the resource constraint
requires that the proportion of households with an endowment located below the budget curve
that contains fi; g is equal to i, the proportion of houses that are of quality x(i) or less. In
general, the resource constraints lead to rather complicated integral equations, although, by dis-
cretizing the house types, the equilibrium can be solved numerically using standard recursive
methods. However, we focus on the post-trade allocation, which simplifies the analysis con-
siderably. We don’t need to know whether an arbitrary initial endowment is associated with a
unique equilibrium. What we need is the following lemma.
Lemma 1 In equilibrium there is positive assortative matching (PAM) by household wealth
and house quality.
That is, in equilibrium, the ranking of households by wealth and by house quality must be
the same. The proof is in the Appendix. In short, the diminishing marginal rate of substitution
guarantees PAM: of any two households, the wealthier must live in the better house, or else the
two could engage in mutually profitable trade. The twist here is that the ordering by wealth
is not known beforehand, because the value of the house is endogenous. So, despite PAM,
the equilibrium allocation is not obvious and depends on the shape of the joint distribution of
fx; g. The benefit of Lemma 1 is that it guarantees that the equilibrium allocation is essentially
one-dimensional, so we can index both households and houses by the house quality quantile i.
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Lemma 2 In equilibrium all households i 2 [0; 1] are located on a curve fx(i); y(i)g in the
endowment space that is continuous almost everywhere. If there are jumps they are upwards.
This follows directly from Lemma 1: as wealth and therefore utility are increasing in i,
downward jumps in y (as a function of i) are ruled out. Similarly, allocations supported over
any thick region in endowment space would violate PAM. Only upward jumps in y are not ruled
out, but there can only be a countable number of them or else y would not stay finite. Hence y
is continuous almost everywhere. However, y does not have to be increasing; indeed, in Section
3.5 we will construct a (somewhat contrived) example where y is strictly decreasing. We prove
the existence of an equilibrium allocation in the Appendix under a finite (but arbitrarily large)
number of house types. The equilibrium is associated with unique prices, up to a constant that
can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of the worst house.
The increasing curve in Figure 2 depicts the equilibrium allocation for one a particular ex-
ample. Households below the curve are the net suppliers of quality: they are endowed with a
relatively high quality house and trade down in order to increase their consumption of the com-
posite good. Households endowed with a house of quality x(i) and income level (i) = y(i)
do not trade. Assuming a full support [x0; x1] [0; 1] for the distribution of endowments, the
end points of the equilibrium curve are necessarily fx0; 0g and fx1; 1g, the endowments of
the unambiguously poorest and richest households in this economy, who have either nothing to
offer or gain in exchange.
We have now characterized what the allocation must look like after all trading opportunities
have been exhausted. From now on we will restrict our analysis to this post-trade world. In a
pure exchange economy, the post-trade allocation can be interpreted as just another endowment.
For notational convenience we will be referring to this “endowment” of the composite good as
:
[ Figure 2 here ]
Under equilibrium prices, all households must be located on a curve (depicted blue in this
example) where they reach the highest possible utility along their budget curve.
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3.1 Equilibrium price gradient
Suppose that all trading opportunities have been exhausted, so that the current allocation is an
equilibrium allocation. Let’s denote by  (i) the observed allocation of composite good for
owners of houses of quality x(i). Now, by definition, equilibrium prices p must result in every
household preferring to live in its own house, so that
i = arg max
j2[0;1]
u (x (j) ;  (i) + p(i)  p (j)) (1)
holds for all i 2 [0; 1]. Since households are atomistic, they take p as given. When the associated
first-order condition, uxx0  uyp0 = 0; is evaluated at the optimal choice j = i the prices cancel
out inside the utility function. (That this optimum is global is guaranteed by Lemma 1.) Solving
for p0 we obtain an equation for equilibrium prices:
p0 (i) =
ux (x (i) ;  (i))
uy (x (i) ;  (i))
x0 (i) . (2)
This price gradient is the key equation of our model. Combined with the exogenous boundary
condition p (0) = p0 it can be solved for the equilibrium price function p. The boundary
condition can be interpreted as the opportunity cost for the lowest-quality house, or as the
reservation price for the poorest household stemming from some exogenous outside opportunity
(such as moving to another region). The continuity of u and x implies that p is continuous.3
The intuition behind the price gradient (2) is that the price difference between any neigh-
boring houses in the quality order depends only on how much the relevant households—at that
particular quantile of the wealth distribution—are willing to pay for that particular quality dif-
ference. This depends on their marginal rate of substitution between house quality and other
goods, which in general depends on the level of wealth. The price level at quantile i is the sum
of the outside price p0 and the integral over all price gradients (2) below i. This is our next
proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose  is an equilibrium allocation. The equilibrium price function is then
unique up to an additive constant p0 and given by
p (i) = p0 +
Z i
0
ux (x (j) ;  (j))
uy (x (j) ;  (j))
x0 (j) dj. (3)
3If  has a discontinuity, as is allowed by Lemma 2, then p has a kink.
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Note that the equilibrium price at any quantile i depends on the distributions of housing
quality and income at all quantiles below i. Hence changes at any part of the price distribution
spill upwards but not downwards. Loosely speaking, in terms of a discrete setup, this asymmetry
in the direction of price spillovers can be understood by considering the problems faced by the
richest and poorest households. If the richest household were to get even richer this would
have no implication on prices, as it would not make the second richest household willing to
pay more for the best house. By contrast, were the poorest household to increase its income
slightly (but so that it still remained the poorest), this would increase its willingness to pay
for the second worst house, thus increasing the second poorest household’s opportunity cost of
living in its house. This, in turn, will increase the second poorest household’s willingness to pay
for the third worst house, and so on, causing the local price increase at the bottom keep spilling
upwards in the distribution.
3.2 Comparative statics
In this section we analyze the comparative statics of equilibrium prices with respect to changes
in income distribution. Here we assume that the economy begins in an equilibrium where there
is a strictly positive relation between income  and house quality. For brevity, we call this a
"regular" equilibrium.
Definition. A regular equilibrium allocation is one where there is a strictly monotonic
increasing relation between household income and house price.
This, in our model, is equivalent to the case where income and wealth are perfectly rank
correlated. As explained earlier, the equilibrium in our setup has to satisfy perfect rank corre-
lation between wealth and house price, which is a weaker requirement.4 The purpose of this
simplification is to make sure that the analytics of the no-trade equilibrium can be used even un-
der changes in income distribution, as order-preserving changes in incomes are then guaranteed
to keep the ranking of households by wealth unchanged. A change in the ordering by wealth
would generate trading and would thus not fall within the scope of the no-trade case.
4In our data the monotonic relation between income and house prices emerges very naturally as a "side-effect"
of kernel smoothing the data under the minimal assumptions needed to make wealth monotonic in house price.
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It is worth noting that, in the light of our model, the claim that an increase in income in-
equality must lead to an increase in the prices of best houses is incorrect.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the endowments form a regular equilibrium allocation, and that the
income distribution experiences a mean-preserving and order-preserving spread where incomes
decrease below quantile h 2 (0; 1) and increase above h. Then housing prices will either i)
decrease everywhere or ii) decrease everywhere except at quantiles (h0; 1], where h0 > h.
Proof. Denote the new distributions by hats. By definition, the new income distribution satisfies
^(i) < (i)
^(i) > (i)
for i 2 [0; h),
for i 2 (h; 1],Z 1
0

^(j)  (j)

dj = 0.
Applying (3), the change in prices at any i 2 [0; 1] is
p^ (i)  p (i) = p0 +
Z i
0
ux(x (j) ; ^ (j))
uy(x (j) ; ^ (j))
x0 (j) dj  

p0 +
Z i
0
ux (x (j) ;  (j))
uy (x (j) ;  (j))
x0 (j) dj

=
Z i
0
 
ux(x (j) ; ^ (j))
uy(x (j) ; ^ (j))
  ux (x (j) ;  (j))
uy (x (j) ;  (j))
!
x0 (j) dj. (4)
The inverse of the marginal rate of substitution between y and x; ux (x; ) =uy (x; ) ; is increas-
ing in , and x0 > 0, so the integrand in (4) is negative at all j where ^ (j) <  (j), i.e., for
j < h. Similarly, the integrand is positive for j > h. The definite integral in (4) must therefore
be strictly negative at i = h, where it reaches its minimum, and increasing above h. If, at some
h0 > h the definite integral reaches zero then it will be positive at all i > h0, but it might not
reach zero before i = 1, in which case the price change is negative at all i 2 (0; 1].
Intuitively, if income is redistributed from poor to rich, this will increase the local price
gradient (2) at the top quantiles, as the willingness-to-pay for extra quality goes up for the
rich. But, for the same reason, the price gradient at bottom quantiles goes down. Above h, the
change in price gradient is positive, but the negative spillover from below will dominate until
some h0 > h, and it can be that the cumulative impact of positive gradients is not enough to
overtake the negative impact. It is therefore possible for all house prices to go down in response
to an increase in inequality. This would happen, for instance, if the quality differences between
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best houses are relatively small so that the rich are less inclined to use income growth to bid up
the price of the next better house.
The impact of a simple increase in income levels is characterized by the next Proposition.
Proposition 5 Suppose the endowments form a regular equilibrium allocation. If all incomes
rise in an order-preserving manner, then housing prices will increase at all quantiles i 2 (0; 1]
and this increase is increasing in i.
The reasoning is similar as in the Proof of Proposition 4, but even simpler because the new
price gradient is greater than the original gradient at all quantiles.
As an immediate corollary, an increase in income levels will also increase the variance of
house prices. A simple extreme case is where all incomes catch up with the highest income
level. Proposition 4 tells us that such a complete elimination of income inequality would in-
crease both the levels and the dispersion of house prices. Intuitively, all households would then
be competing for the best houses and the price difference between a low quality and a high
quality house must become relatively large to make some household willing to hold the low
quality house.
The exogenous bottom price p(0) is held constant under comparative statics, so the price
distribution we are really referring to is for quantiles (0; 1]. A change in the lowest price, p0,
would cause all prices to change by that same amount. As the model does not include the pos-
sibility to move out of the market, the level of the constant is irrelevant for the attractiveness of
any trade: it increases both the buying and selling prices, and thus washes out of all transactions.
3.3 Absentee landlords: a digression
In urban economics models with heterogeneous land it is standard to assume that all land is
initially owned by competitive outside sellers or “absentee landlords.” This is similar in spirit
to two-sided matching in that, by construction, sellers’ reservation prices can be considered
exogenous to the problem. The absentee landlord assumption can be introduced to our model
by assuming that the revenue from house sales goes to atomistic outside agents who are not
buyers in this market and have no market power as sellers.
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Consider the household at quantile i of the income distribution. Again, by Lemma 1, equilib-
rium must involve positive assortative matching by wealth, which now consists only of income
, and house quality. Thus p must result in every household buying a house of the same quality
rank as is their rank in the wealth distribution.
i = arg max
j2[0;1]
u (x (j) ;  (i)  p (j)) for all i 2 [0; 1] (5)
Here the price of the house actually chosen is not part of household wealth and so it does not
cancel out of the price gradient. As a result, equilibrium prices are now defined as a nonlinear
ordinary differential equation:
p0 (i) =
ux (x (i) ;  (i)  p (i))
uy (x (i) ;  (i)  p (i))x
0 (i) . (6)
Combined with a boundary condition this can still be solved for the equilibrium price function
p. Now the boundary condition must satisfy p0   (0), or else the poorest household cannot
afford to live anywhere.
If all houses were owned by an absentee monopolist, then the self-selection constraint (6)
would still have to hold, but the seller could restrict the quantity sold. This would require the
monopolist to be able to credibly commit to not selling the lowest quality houses up until some
quantilem 2 (0; 1). The lowest price p(m)would then have to be pinned down by some outside
opportunity for the buyers (e.g. an exogenous utility level from living in another region).
3.4 The case with CES
For the empirical application we assume CES utility,
u (x; y) = (x + (1  ) y) 1 , where  < 1 and  2 (0; 1), (7)
with Cobb-Douglas utility defined in the usual fashion at  = 0. If wealth is just equal to income
 (as in the absentee landlord setup above), then the equilibrium price gradient (6) is
p0 (i) =

1  

 (i)  p (i)
x (i)
1 
x0 (i) . (8)
Under the post-trade assumption, where wealth is equal to the sum of income and the equilib-
rium value of one’s house, (i) + p(i), the prices cancel out in the right-hand side and this can
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be solved as
p (i) = p0 +

1  
Z i
0

 (s)
x (s)
1 
x0 (s) ds. (9)
When p and  are observed, then x can be solved for under a given elasticity parameter . The
other preference parameter, , is absorbed by the units of x and can then be normalized at, say,
one half.
Example: Pareto distributions Equilibrium prices have a closed-form solution in our model
only under specific assumptions. Our empirical applications do not require such a solution, but
they are useful for theoretical insights. Here we present an example with a closed-form solution.
Assume that both income and house quality follow Pareto distributions, so that ~Pareto(0; )
and x~Pareto(x0; ), where w0 > p0 and ;  > 2. The associated quantile functions are
 (i) = 0 (1  i) 
1
 and x (i) = x0 (1  i) 
1

. If utility takes the CES form (7) then, under the
post-trade interpretation, the equilibrium prices (9) can be solved in closed form:
p (i) = p0 +

1  


1 0 x

0

(1  i)  1   1

(10)
where   
1 (1 =) . This means that prices are distributed according to a Generalized Pareto
Distribution. The expenditure share of housing a (i)  p (i) = (p(i) +  (i)) can be shown to
have a limiting value at 1 if  > 0 and at 0 if  < 0. (This expenditure share is really the share
of housing out of total wealth, which includes lifetime permanent income.) In the knife-edge
Cobb-Douglas case it is
a (1) =

 + (1  )  . (11)
The expenditure share a is then everywhere increasing if a (1) > a0  p0= (p0 + 0) (decreasing
if a (1) < a0). If housing at the extensive margin can be created at constant marginal cost then
the poorest household faces in effect linear prices and it is reasonable to assume that a (0) = .
In this case the expenditure share of housing is strictly increasing in income if and only if  > ,
i.e., when the variance of wealth is lower than the variance of house quality.
This example illustrates how one cannot expect the expenditure shares to be constant across
income levels, even if utility function takes the Cobb-Douglas form. The expenditure share
of housing is not directly given by preferences because the prices faced by the consumers are
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nonlinear. The standard CES result that expenditure shares are independent of income is based
on all goods being fungible, so that there is essentially just one type of housing.
Example: Degenerate wealth distribution Suppose all households have the same wealth
level w and preferences are Cobb-Douglas. Now prices must make every household indifferent
between every housing unit. Then (8) reduces to
p (i) = w   ( w   p0)

x0
x (i)
 
1 
(12)
where w > p0 must be assumed. This extreme example provides the simplest demonstration of
why the expenditure share of housing cannot be expected to be constant even if preferences are
the same for all – some households simply must end up with the lower quality houses and for
this they must be compensated with higher consumption of other goods.
3.5 Planner’s problem: another digression
Suppose a social planner decided on the allocation, with the objective of maximizing average
utility. (Equivalently, suppose the households were allowed to agree on the allocation behind
a veil of ignorance.) The fixed distribution of house quality forces the planner to impose the
unequal distribution of x on the households. The planner’s problem consists of dividing the total
endowment of the composite good between the households according to some positive function
y, subject to budget constraint.
max
y0
Z 1
0
u (x (i) ; y (i)) di st.
Z 1
0
y (i) di = . (13)
Pointwise maximization reveals that it is optimal to equate the marginal utility of the composite
good across households
uy (x(i); y
 (i)) =  for all i; (14)
where the constant  > 0 is determined by the resource constraint. By differentiation of (14)
we see that
dy=dx =  uxy=uyy; (15)
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so if uxy < 0 then those who are given better houses are given less money. In such a case
the planner’s allocation would also be an example of an equilibrium allocation where there is a
strictly negative relation between non-housing consumption and house quality.
Example. CES-utility.
For CES utility  uxy=uyy = y=x, so, by (15), the solution must be of the form
y = kx. (16)
The constant k > 0 is determined by the resource constraint:
k = =
Z 1
0
x(i)di. (17)
Under CES utility the goods are complementary in the sense that, behind a veil of ignorance,
an individual would prefer to allocate more money for the states of the world where she has a
better house (this already follows from uxy > 0).
The planner’s solution under CES preferences is intuitively unappealing, because CES ex-
hibits risk neutrality with respect to wealth. In a setup with aggregation over states of the world
a more general utility function is needed.
Example. CRRA-CES utility is defined as v(x; y) = 1
 
u(x; y) ; where u is the ordinary
CES-utility (7) and   1 captures relative risk aversion. The expression (15) is now, after
some simplification,
dy=dx =
x 1y
(1  )x + (1  )(1   ) (y) (   ) . (18)
Thus dy=dx > 0 if and only if  > . Under CRRA-CES utility there is tension between the
complementarity of consumption between the two goods, which is decreasing in , and between
the risk aversion, which is decreasing in  . The complementarity drives the planner to allocate
more non-housing consumption to households who get better houses, while risk aversion drives
to the opposite direction. When complementarity dominates ( <  ), as is necessarily the case
under standard CES ( = 1) the planner will allocate more money to the lucky recipients of the
better houses.
Naturally, risk aversion over wealth would make no difference in our main model as there is
no uncertainty. Any positive monotone transformation of u cancels out of individual optimiza-
tion and market equilibrium conditions, leaving (1) and (2) unaffected.
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4 Inferring quality and computing counterfactuals
In the empirical application we assume that observed prices correspond to the equilibrium prices
that emerge after all trading opportunities have been exhausted. We think this is a reasonable
interpretation of cross-sectional data because, at any point in time, only a small fraction of
households trade houses. Under this assumption we can infer the unobserved distribution of
house qualities from the observed relation between household income and house prices. That
is, for given distributions p and , and for a given utility function u, we can infer the distribution
of x. (We discuss the inference of preferences in the next section.) This can be done by treating
x as the unknown in the differential equation (2), while normalizing the boundary condition
x(0) = x0 at any positive value.
Having inferred the distribution of x based on the observed distributions of  and p, we can
then posit a counterfactual income distribution ^ and generate the implied counterfactual distri-
bution of house prices, by combining ^ and x in the (discrete equivalent of) equilibrium price
relation (9). Note, however, that as p0 is exogenous, our model only explains the differences in
prices relative to the marginal unit of housing, p  p0. In the counterfactuals the lowest price is
always taken to be the lowest price in the data.
We now discretize the model and assume CES utility. In each market, we have data on prices
(house values) p0 < p1 <    < pN and the associated household incomes h. The minimal
requirement for the data to be consistent with the model is that observed wealth p +  must be
in strictly positive relation with p (Lemma 1). This relation is, of course, not perfect in reality,
but it emerges very naturally in our data with some smoothing (details will be explained later).
The basis for inference is the "incentive compatibility" condition that makes household h
want to buy its equilibrium match—which is house h—instead of any other house h0. For CES
utility, these conditions are
(xh + (1  ) (h))
1
  (xh0 + (1  ) (h + ph   ph0))
1

, for all h; h0 2 f0; : : : ; Ng.
(19)
Thanks to PAM, we can ignore this constraint for all other household pairs except for those who
are "neighbors" in the rank by house quality, (h0 = h   1). For convenience, we assume that
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these constraints hold as an equality, and we obtain a discrete equivalent of the price gradient.5
ph = ph 1 +

(h)
 +

1  
 
xh   xh 1
 1   h (20)
Equivalently, solving for xh yields the inference formula
xh =

xh 1 +
1  

[(h + ph   ph 1)   (h)]
 1

. (21)
Note that the value of  2 (0; 1) is without consequence when x is unobserved, because chang-
ing  is equivalent to changing the units of x. We set  = 1=2. (The levels of x are not
themselves useful, and this normalization is without loss of generality for the counterfactuals
that we are interested in). Denoting x^ = x, (21) can now be solved as
x^h = x^0 +
hX
j=1
[(j + pj   pj 1)   (j)] ; (22)
which includes an undefined constant of integration x^0, i.e. the quality of the worst occupied
house.
Our main empirical interest is in constructing prices under counterfactual income distrib-
utions. Conceptually this is easiest to understand as combining inferred x^h; observed p0, and
posited counterfactual ^h in the discrete price formula (20), to obtain counterfactual prices p^h.
In the CES case the steps can be combined to yield the counterfactual prices directly as
p^h = p^h 1 +

(h + ph   ph 1)   (h) +

^h
 1   ^h. (23)
5 Empirical application
5.1 Data and smoothing
We use income and price data from the American Housing Survey (AHS) for six metropolitan
areas (MA, or "city"): Baltimore, Boston, Houston, Minneapolis, Tampa, and Washington. The
choice of MAs was strictly determined by the availability of data. The most populous MAs are
5In the discrete setup there is a match-specific rent that the "neighbors" could bargain over. Here we in effect
assume that "sellers" have all bargaining power. Making the opposite assumption makes virtually no difference to
the empirical results.
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covered only in national-level data (the National Surveys), where house prices are top coded
at a common national threshold. This results in a disproportionate censoring of observations
in the largest MAs. Furthermore, in those MAs where the national data is not decimated by
top coding it suffers from small sample size, which unfortunately renders the national surveys
useless for our purposes. Fortunately, certain mid-size cities are covered in separate "Metro
surveys," which have been conducted at irregular intervals, but are less affected by the top-
coding problem because it is done at city-level. Our sample includes all MAs from which there
is metro survey data both in 2007 (the most recent year) and 1998 (the second most recent year
for the MAs surveyed in 2007).
In the AHS metro survey data, the house prices have been censored separately at each MA
at the 97% percentile. Thus we have to exclude the top 3% from our analysis. Furthermore,
there are apparently significant data quality issues at the bottom of the price distributions, with
many house prices observed in the range of a few hundred or thousands of dollars. For this
reason we drop the bottom 5% of houses in each MA, and so the 5th percentile price will be the
lowest (and thus exogenous) house price in our analysis. All of our results refer to this restricted
sample, except where otherwise mentioned.
Our income measure is total disposable income, including taxes and transfers, during the last
year. House price is based on the survey question where respondents were asked to estimate the
current market value of their house. We consider only homeowners, which amounts to assuming
that rental housing forms an entirely separate market.
We also need to set an interest rate r to make the units of yearly income compatible with
the house price: income  is measured as annual income divided by the interest rate. (In effect,
we assume that households face an infinite time-horizon, and expect no changes in the future.)
We fix the interest rate at r = 0:05. Changing r over a reasonable range (2   8%) makes little
difference to our inferred elasticity parameter  or the results of the counterfactual experiments
that we present below.
We observe the joint distribution of income  and house price p in each of the six MAs for
both 1998 and 2007. To be consistent with the equilibrium of our model, the levels of observed
wealth w =  + p should be perfectly rank correlated with house value p (recall Lemma 1). To
achieve this, we first reduce the relation of income and house price into a curve, by using kernel
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regression to estimate  (i) as E[jFp (p) = i], where Fp is the empirical CDF of p. Figures 3
and 4 display the actual and kernel smoothed incomes relative to the quantile by house price.
There is a strong positive relationship between house value and income.6 Rank correlation
between income and house price is between 0:38 (Boston) and 0:52 (Houston) We denote the
distributions for years t 2 f98, 07g by ft; ptg, where t is smoothed and pt is raw data.
[ Figures 3 and 4 here ]
Actual and kernel smoothed household income plotted against house value quantile by
metropolitan area and year. Gray dots depict excluded or top-coded data.
Table 1 displays Gini coefficients for our estimated permanent income (i.e. smoothed in-
come), annual income, and house value. All MAs feature an increase in income inequality
from 1998 to 2007. Housing values show no such systematic pattern. Figure 5 displays the
distributions of smoothed income relative to its mean in 1998 and 2007. The only apparently
exceptional case is Houston where lowest incomes have grown faster than the mean.
Permanent income Income House value Rank correlation
1998 2007 1998 2007 1998 2007 1998 2007
Baltimore 0.16 0.17 0.37 0.40 0.27 0.28 0.38 0.48
Boston 0.13 0.17 0.36 0.44 0.25 0.23 0.48 0.46
Houston 0.18 0.20 0.39 0.41 0.30 0.27 0.53 0.52
Minneapolis 0.14 0.16 0.33 0.36 0.23 0.23 0.50 0.49
Tampa 0.19 0.23 0.41 0.52 0.29 0.31 0.52 0.48
Washington 0.14 0.17 0.33 0.39 0.25 0.23 0.50 0.49
Table 1. Summary statistics for inequality (Gini coefficient) of permanent income, income,
and house value, and for the Spearman rank correlation between income and house value.
"Permanent income" is income kernel smoothed relative to house price.
[ Figure 5 here ]
Distribution of permanent income relative to mean by city and year.
6We use the Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth of 9%, except in Tampa where a bandwidth of 11% is
required for the smoothed data to conform to assortative matching by wealth and house price.
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In reality the value of the house consists of the value of land and the value of structures.
It is, of course, possible to adjust the quality of the structures to some extent. We abstract
away from adjustable quality and concentrate on relatively short term variation in our empirical
application. However, even in the long term, according to Davis and Heathcote (2007), most
growth and volatility in U.S. house prices has been due to variation in land values.7
5.2 Inferring preferences
We now impose the CES-utility function specified in (7) and infer the elasticity parameter .
We infer  both separately for each MA while restricting it to be the same at all MAs. Given
 and f98; p98g, we first infer the quality distribution in 1998, denoted by x98, using the infer-
ence formula in (22). Having inferred x98 from 1998 data, we then use the equilibrium price
formula—the discretized equivalent of (9)—to predict the 2007 housing price distribution given
actual observed wealth in 2007 (07 + p07) and x98. In other words, assuming that the quality
distribution x is fixed, we ask what would be the predicted price distribution in 2007 given the
observed 2007 income distribution. We denote this prediction by p^07. We set the price of the
lowest quality house (5th percentile in the full sample) equal to the actual value, again because
the model does not explain the absolute price level but rather the difference over the lowest
quality house. We also have to implicitly assume that the ranking of households by income has
not changed, as we apply a static model in both years.
We compare the model’s predicted price distribution to the empirical 2007 distribution for
a range of values for , where each comparison involves the entire procedure described above.
Figure 6 illustrates this for the cases of Boston and Tampa. It shows the observed 2007 housing
price distribution as well as the predicted housing price distributions under various values for .
Notice how assuming Cobb-Douglas preferences ( = 0) would result in systematic underpre-
diction of the prices. Our preferred elasticity parameter is the one where the mismatch between
the empirical and predicted 2007 housing price distribution is the smallest. Formally, we pick
 in order to minimize the mean of absolute percentage errors (MAPE), i.e. the mean value
of jlog(p07(i))  log(p^07(ij))j. Thus we are trying to match the entire 2007 price distribution
7Davis and Palumbo (2008) estimate the share of land in house values for detached single-family homes; in our
sample cities it ranges between 31% (Houston) and 76% (Boston) in 2004.
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with just two parameters, the other being the bottom price p0 which we match exactly by con-
struction. In the case where  is restricted to be the same in all MAs, it is chosen by minimizing
the unweighted average of MAPE across the six MAs.
[ Figure 6 here]
Actual and predicted price distributions under various values of  in two example cities.
Table 2 shows for each MA the number of observations by year, the inferred value for the
elasticity of substitution, and the minimized value of MAPE. The last row corresponds to the
case where the elasticity parameter is restricted to be common for all MAs. The common
preferences case results in elasticity of 0:50, which is in the middle of the MA-specific elastic-
ities which are also relatively close to each other, ranging from 0:32 to 0:89. (We discuss the
meaning of income elasticity in this context below.) The measure of fit varies substantially over
different MAs. The fit is clearly better in Boston, Houston, and Minneapolis than in Tampa or
Washington.
Figure 7 shows the relative price error, log(p07=p^07), by quantile of house value. Our simple
model seems to provide a reasonable fit in most cities. The exceptions are Tampa and Wash-
ington. According to the model, the prices of the best houses should have increased much more
there than they actually did. It may be that the supply of top quality housing is relatively elastic
in these two cities, whereas we assume a fixed quality distribution. At least for Tampa, it seems
plausible that there are relatively attractive undeveloped locations, while in a city like Boston
the best locations are mostly already either built up or protected from development. Elastic
housing supply is also an example of an omitted factor that would bias our estimate of the elas-
ticity parameter. However, as we show below, the results of our main counterfactual experiment
are, in the end, relatively insensitive to the value of the elasticity parameter.
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N98 N07 1=(1  ) MAPE
Baltimore 2306 1211 0.42 4.6
Boston 1960 1075 0.63 2.8
Houston 1963 1105 0.89 2.3
Minneapolis 2741 1524 0.48 2.6
Tampa 2106 1255 0.49 8.3
Washington 2356 1315 0.32 9.1
All 13432 7485 0.50 12.2
Table 2. Number of observations by year, estimated elasticity of substitution, and the min-
imized mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) for the predicted price in 2007. "All" refers to
the case where preference parameter () is restricted to be the same in all cities.
[ Figure 7 here ]
Errors in predicted 2007 house prices by metropolitan area. Solid blue line refers to the
baseline case, where preferences are estimated separately in each MA, and dashed red line to
the case where preferences are restricted to be the same everywhere.
5.3 Income elasticity of housing expenditure
The inferred elasticities in Table 2 are in line with many studies that use household data (see
e.g. Li et al., 2009, and the references therein). However, as always in structural estimation,
the interpretation of the parameters depends on the specifics of the model. Our estimates are
not directly comparable with those obtained in studies that do not take into account the friction
arising from the indivisibility of houses. In our setup, the effective income and price elastici-
ties of housing demand are not determined solely by assumptions about preferences, because
prices are a nonlinear function of quality. This nonlinearity also implies that income and price
elasticities of housing expenditure will vary across income levels (despite CES utility).
In order to illustrate these features, let us define income elasticity of housing demand at
quantile i using a counterfactual increase in housing expenditure that would result if a sin-
gle household were to alone experience a change in income. Following a 4 percent change
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in income at quantile i, the household will reoptimize its consumption. Housing expenditure
changes from p(i) to p(j), where
j = arg max
s2[0;1]
(u(x(s); (1 +4)(i) + p(i)  p(s)) (24)
is the household’s new quantile in the distributions of wealth and housing quality, given that
everyone else’s incomes stay the same.
In equilibrium, this elasticity can be determined just from current prices and incomes. Since
there is positive assortative matching by housing quality and wealth, we can find the new hous-
ing expenditure p(j) simply by finding where the household will be located in the wealth distri-
bution after its income is changed. Thus j from (24) solves (1 +4)(i) + p(i) = (j) + p(j).
The change in wealth position is independent of the utility function (as long as it exhibits the di-
minishing MRS required for positive sorting). In the end, this result stems from the assumption
that houses are indivisible and have fixed qualities.
Figure 8 shows the income elasticity of housing expenditure in each MA. For each quantile
i, the elasticity is computed as the midpoint arc elasticity around 07(i) with a 10% income
change.8 We can calculate this elasticity only up to the point where the hypothetical income
increase would lift the households outside our data range, which at the top is the top-coding
threshold. Figure 8 reveals how income elasticity varies quite substantially over the distribu-
tion. Intuitively, how much more one would spend on housing following an increase in income
depends on the increase in housing quality that would be available. In this model, the housing
quality that one extra dollar can buy varies over the distribution, as it depends on the shape of
the quality distribution and on the incomes of competing buyers.
[ Figure 8 here]
Estimated income elasticity of housing expenditure by quantile in the distribution of wealth.
Given that there is assortative matching, the shape of the utility function matters only when
there are aggregate changes. The counterfactual embedded in the individual household’s de-
mand elasticity holds prices constant because one household has a vanishingly small impact on
8Using a smaller results in otherwise similar but more "erratic" elasticity curves. This is because the distrib-
ution of prices has not been smoothed, so small changes in i can result in large changes in p(i):
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prices. By contrast, if all household incomes go up by 4 percent then prices react; by how
much depends on preferences. (Now no one will actually move, because everyone’s rank in
wealth distribution stays the same.) By substituting into (9), we see that under CES utility all
price differences (p  p0) blow up by a factor of (1 +4)1 .
The observation that the elasticity of demand varies substantially over the distribution sug-
gest that estimating household preferences without taking into account the indivisibility and
heterogeneity of houses is problematic. For instance, the effects of a given change in aggregate
income on aggregate housing demand can depend on the associated changes in the distribution
of income. This is also illustrated by the following counterfactual experiments.
5.4 Counterfactuals
The empirical question we set out to answer was how changes in income distribution influence
housing prices. We now apply our methodology to a specific data set to compute the impact of
increased income inequality between 1998 to 2007 on housing prices in six US metropolitan
areas. Specifically, given the inferred values for  (see Table 2) and the quality distributions
x98 in each MA, we compute the predicted price distributions in 2007 under a counterfactual
income distribution that has the same shape as in 1998 but the same mean as in 2007. (The
counterfactual income distribution is also assumed to preserve the ranking of households by
income.) We then compare this counterfactual price distribution with the fitted price distribution
that is obtained by plugging in the actual 2007 income distribution; the difference between the
two is the impact of increased inequality. When interpreting these results it is important to keep
in mind that we keep all other things, including the supply of housing, fixed.
Results are shown in Figure 9. It displays the relative difference between counterfactual
and empirical housing prices. Our benchmark case is the one where the elasticity parameter
is estimated separately for each MA. In addition, we consider the case where the elasticity
parameter is restricted to be the same for all MAs.
Consider first the benchmark case. The impact of increased income inequality is qualita-
tively similar in all but one MA: it has lowered housing prices until about 80-90th percentile
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and increased prices in the upper tail.9 The exception is Houston, where changes near the bot-
tom of the income distribution work to increase the prices of the lowest quality houses. This
reflects the fact, visible in Figure 5, that in Houston, unlike in the other MAs, the lowest incomes
have increased relative to the mean income, even though the Gini coefficient has increased there
as in other MAs.
By and large, the results are similar in the case where the elasticity parameter is the same for
all MAs. In particular, the point at which the price effect turns from negative to positive is almost
the same in both specifications. Also the increase in the price of even the best houses (those at
the 97th percentile) is always moderate. Intuitively, the increase in income inequality results in
lower incomes at the bottom of the distribution relative to the counterfactual of uniform income
growth. This works to lower the prices of the lowest quality houses. As explained in Section
3.2, this negative price impact at the bottom spills upwards in the quality distribution. This
effect counteracts the local increase in willingness-to-pay among the lower part of the better-off
households who in actuality saw their incomes rise faster than the mean.
[ Figure 9 here]
The impact of increased income inequality on housing prices.
The average price changes are shown in Table 3. The first two columns display the mean
relative effect of the change in the shape of the income distribution on house prices for the
MA-specific and common preference specifications. The third column displays the absolute
price change in the benchmark case. The mean impact of change in income inequality in the
benchmark specification varies from  10:1% in Tampa to 0:2% in Houston.
More speculatively, we also consider the impact of the overall income inequality on housing
prices by computing the equilibrium prices (again, given the same estimated quality distribution
x98) while assuming that all households have the mean income observed in 2007. The last
two columns in Table 3 display the mean effects of this radical counterfactual. According
to the model, overall income inequality lowers housing prices by 19   52% relative to the
counterfactual of total income equality.
9Recall that our income measure is an estimated permanent income.
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Change (%) Change ($k) Total (%) Total ($k)
benchmark common  benchmark benchmark benchmark
Baltimore -4.4 -3.6 -16.0 -43 -270
Boston -4.5 -5.9 -23.3 -20 -123
Houston +0.2 +0.6 +2.7 -19 -35
Minneapolis -2.6 -2.5 -7.7 -26 -102
Tampa -10.1 -9.9 -27.6 -52 -266
Washington -6.6 -4.0 -36.7 -47 -460
Table 3. Change: The impact of the change in the shape of the income distribution on house
prices between 2007 and 1998, relative to what house prices would have been under uniform
income growth. Total: The impact of income inequality on house prices in 2007, relative to
what house prices would be under equal income.
6 Conclusion
We have presented a new framework for studying the relationship between the income distribu-
tion and the housing price distribution. In the model houses are heterogeneous and indivisible.
The key element is that all houses are owned by the households, and, due to concave utility, their
reservation prices as sellers depend on the opportunities available to them as buyers, which in
turn depend on their incomes and on the prices of other houses. Thus, our model provides a
framework for analyzing how income differences get capitalized into house prices. The equi-
librium is tractable under the assumption that households prefer to live in their current house.
The equilibrium can be understood intuitively by considering the price gradient, which is,
loosely, the price difference between “neighboring” houses in the quality distribution. The price
gradient expresses how much households that inhabit a particular part of the quality distribution
in equilibrium are willing to pay for the quality difference over next best house. This depends
on their marginal rate of substitution between house quality and other goods, which in general
depends on their level of wealth. The price level at any quantile in the distribution is the sum
over all price gradients below.
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The natural comparative static in our setup is order-preserving changes in income distribu-
tion, as these have an impact on prices without generating trading. The model yields a number
of theoretical implications about the relation of income and house price distributions. Any
increase in income levels will increase both the level and dispersion of house prices, but an
increase in income inequality will decrease house prices except (possibly) in a segment adja-
cent to the top. House prices at the top can go either way in response to an increase in income
inequality, depending on the details of both supply and demand sides of the market.
The equilibrium conditions enabled us to estimate the housing quality distribution without
imposing restrictions on the shapes of the distributions. As our main empirical application we
analyzed housing prices in six US metropolitan regions. We obtained a theory-driven estimate
for the impact of recent increases in income inequality on house prices. Specifically, we asked
how the 2007 price distribution would differ from the actual price distribution if income of every
household would have grown at the actual mean rate since 1998. We found that the impact of
increased inequality on prices has been modest but negative on average, and positive only at
the top decile. This is because the cumulative impact of reductions in the price gradient at the
bottom households, whose income growth did not keep up with the mean growth, dominates
the positive effects almost all the way to the top of the distribution.
Our model opens the possibility for other applications. Most directly, it is a natural frame-
work for studying how various housing and income subsidy schemes impact housing prices.
The intuition of the price gradient makes it clear why housing subsidies targeted for the poor
will not merely be capitalized into prices of low-quality housing but will spill upwards in the
quality ladder. A serious empirical analysis of this issue will require the inclusion of non-owner-
occupied housing.
The counterfactuals presented in this paper took the form of order-preserving changes in the
exogenous income distribution. This was crucial for being able to apply the formulae derived
under the assumption of no-trade equilibrium. The lack of trading also meant that price changes
do not have welfare effects–they are merely changes in paper wealth. In order to have welfare
effects, price changes have to generate trading. One interesting and challenging topic for further
study is the welfare effects of regulations, for instance transaction taxes, which can be expected
to distort the matching of houses and households. A particularly policy-relevant issue is the
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impact of repealing rent control, which would result in a simultaneous supply and demand
shock. Again, the impact on the entire distribution of housing prices is likely to be nontrivial.
Our characterization of the (no-trade) equilibrium should be helpful even in applications that
involve trading, although these will require more involved numerical methods.
7 Appendix
Proof: Lemma 1 Positive assortative matching (PAM) by wealth and house quality.
Define the reservation price (x0jx; y) by
u(x; y) = u(x0; y  ); (25)
so that is the maximum price that a household with endowment (x; y) 2 R2+ is willing to pay
to switch into a house of type x0. Thus fx0; y + (x0jx; y)g traces an indifference curve that
goes through the endowment (x; y); it is strictly decreasing, and  changes sign at x0 = x: The
reservation price of switching into a worse house is negative.
Consider two households, h = 1; 2, endowed with houses x1 < x2. There is trade between
them if and only if their reservation prices for the trade sum up to something positive, i.e., if
S(x1; y1; x2; y2) := (x2jx1; y1) + (x1jx2; y2) > 0. (26)
The wealthier household has a larger budget set, so PAM by wealth and house quality is
equivalent with PAM by utility and house quality. We want to show that if x1 < x2 and
u (x1; y1) > u (x2; y2) then there must be trade, as this rules out any violations of PAM in
equilibrium.
Consider a point fx2; y02gwhere y02 = y1 (x2jx1; y1). This is along the indifference curve
going through (x1; y1) and vertical in relation to (x2; y2): Swapping positions between (x2; y02)
and (x1; y1) does not change utility so if y2 = y02 then (x1jx2; y02) + (x2jx1; y1) = 0: If
(x1jx2; y) is strictly decreasing in y then there will be trade if and only if y2 < y02, which is
equivalent to u(x1; y1) > u(x2; y2). Differentiating (25) we obtain
d
dy
= 1  uy (x2; y)
uy (x1; y  ) . (27)
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We know that uy is positive and decreasing for a fixed x, but now the comparison is at two
different levels of x, yet on the same indifference curve. Use ~y(x) to denote the indifference
curve. Thus (27) is negative if
d
dx
(uy (x; ~y(x))) = uxy + uyy

d~y(x)
dx

= uxy   uyy

ux
uy

 0 (28)
This is just the condition for diminishing marginal rate of substitution MRSyx to be decreasing
in y (i.e., for MRSxy to be increasing in y), which holds for any quasi-concave utility function.
Proof: Existence of equilibrium Let’s now discretize the house types, so that 0 < x0 <
   < xN < 1. For brevity, we will refer to households endowed with a type-k house as
households of type k. Denote the mass of type-k households with income equal or lower than
 by Fk (). We assume that all of these conditional income distributions are continuous with
full support [; ], where 0 <  <  < 1. The mass of type-k households is mk > 0, so
Fk
 


= mk. Recall that we have normalized the total mass at
P
mk = 1.
With discretized house types we require an additional assumption:
u(xk 1; ) > u(xk; ) for all k = 1; : : : ; N: (29)
This means that distribution of autarky utility has overlap between neighboring household types.
Together with Lemma 1, this implies that there must be trade between them, which in turn will
guarantee that price increments are uniquely determined.
Lemma 1 shows that equilibrium utility is increasing in the quality of the house consumed.
The full support of incomes and the overlap of autarky utilities imply that the consumption
levels y of households that consume a house of type k must be distributed with full support on
some interval [y
k
; yk] 2 [; ]. The unequivocally poorest and richest households do not have
anyone to trade with, so y
0
=  and yN = .
The wealthiest household that consumes a type k house must be indifferent between trading
up to the next house type. This indifference condition defines the price increments k =
pk   pk 1 as functions of upper bounds yk,
 (ykjxk; xk+1) = fk+1 : u (xk; yk) = u (xk+1; yk  k+1)g for all k = 0; : : : ; N   1. (30)
Note that  is single-valued for all yk 2 [; ], with image in (0; yk).
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The same indifference conditions can also be described in terms of the lower bounds of the
consumption intervals, with u(xk; yk+1 +k+1) = u(xk+1; yk+1), so
y
k+1
= yk  k+1 = yk    (ykjxk; xk+1) . (31)
Thus the lower bounds as well as the price increments are uniquely determined by the upper
bounds, so the equilibrium allocation can be described in terms of the yk alone, where k =
0; : : : ; N   1.10
Demand for type-k houses is the sum of demands from each household type. Consider
type j households endowed with income . They will consume a type-k house if their wealth
is in the same range as of those type k households who consume their endowment: pj +  2
[pk + yk; pk + yk]: The bounding inequalities for these intervals can be written as
  yk + pk   pj
  y
k
+ pk   pj = yk 1 + pk 1   pj (32)
for k = 0; : : : ; N   1. (Recall that yN = .) Total demand for type k houses is
Qk (y) =
NX
j=0
[Fj (yk + pk   pj)  Fj (yk 1 + pk 1   pj)] (33)
=
k 1X
j=0
[Fj (yk + (j+1 +   +k))  Fj (yk 1 + (j+1 +   +k 1))]
+Fk (yk)  Fj (yk 1  k)
+
NX
j=k+1
[Fj (yk   (k+1 +   +j))  Fj (yk 1   (k +   +j))] , (34)
wherek are functions of y as defined by (30) and (31). Define the excess demand functions as
Zk (y) = max f0; Qk (y)g  mk, (35)
where the infeasible negative demands allowed by (33) are removed. The nonnegativity con-
straint is binding if the upper bound yk is below the lower bound yk implied by yk 1.
10Equivalently, the allocation can be described in terms of the lower bounds y
k
or prices k, where k =
1; : : : ; N . This choice of independent variables is a matter of convenience.
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Each household has zero net demand for housing units, because not trading amounts to
demanding your own house. Thus ZN (y) =  
PN 1
k=0 Zk (y) and market equilibrium can be
defined as
Zk (y) = 0 for k = 0; : : : ; N   1, (36)
or, in vector form, Z (y) = 0. This is a system of N equations in N unknowns.
Consider the best response of an imaginary "player" who attempts to minimize the absolute
value of excess demand for type k houses with the sole instrument of choosing the upper bound
yk. (The top house type, where yN =  by construction, does not have a "player" representing
it.) Use y k to denote the vector y without the k:th element. The best response function is
ak (y k) = arg min
a2[;]
jZk (ajy k)j . (37)
It is straightforward to show that Zk is continuous and increasing in a, but there may be a flat
region. This happens when a is below the lower bound y
k
determined by y k. Then demand
for k type houses is zero, and Zk (ajy k) =  mk. However, the highest possible lower bound
is strictly below , by (31) it is      jxk 1; xk, so Zk must be strictly increasing in some
interval [; ]. There are two possibilities
ak (y k) =
8<: ; Zk
 
jy k
  0
; Zk (jy k) = 0
, (38)
where  2 (; ). Thus ak is single-valued but may not be able to eliminate excess supply for
k. Hence a (y) = (a0 (y 0) ; : : : ; aN 1
 
y (N 1)

) defines a continuous vector-valued function
from [; ]N to itself. Thus, by Brouwer Fixed Point theorem, there exists a fixed point y =
a (y).
Next we prove, by contradiction, that a fixed point must be a market equilibrium. Suppose
that y = a (y) but Zk(y) < 0 for some k, so yk = : Now consider the highest such k, so that
Zh (y
) = 0 for all higher types h 2 fk + 1; : : : ; N   1g. Since y
k+1
=     jxk; xk+1 > 
(due to overlap of autarky utilities) at least some k + 1-types are trading down, while no one
among types k or lower is trading up to houses above k. Hence Zh > 0 for at least one h < k, a
contradiction with (38). Intuitively, all demand for houses k+1 and higher would have to come
from households endowed with those houses. Since some of them are trading down, there must
be excess demand for some h > k.
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Thus any fixed point of Z indeed defines an equilibrium allocation of our model. Finally,
since  is strictly increasing, the equilibrium allocation is associated with unique price incre-
ments k, so associated equilibrium prices pk are unique up to an additive constant. (However,
we have not shown that there is a unique equilibrium allocation).
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